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LEGISLATIVE RESTRAINT IN THE
CONFIRMATION PROCESS
The Honorable Kenneth W. Starr *
Thank you, President Sullivan,1 Chief Justice Rehnquist,2
Chief Justice Carrico, in whose honor we gather, Mrs. Carrico,
Judge Wilkinson,3 Mr. President,4 and Dean.5
During the debates over ratification of the United States Con-
stitution, Mr. Madison issued a warning. He issued a warning in
The Federalist that there were numerous dangers to balanced
government, which is what the architects of the Constitution be-
lieved they had created in the proposed government.6 Madison
further advised that the attack to balance was most likely to come
from the legislative branch.7
* Partner, Kirkland & Ellis LLP, Washington, D.C. A.B., 1968, George Washington
University; A.M., 1969, Brown University; J.D., 1973, Duke University. In August 1994,
Judge Starr was appointed Independent Counsel on the Whitewater matter. From May 27,
1989 to January 20, 1993, Judge Starr served as Solicitor General of the United States.
Prior to becoming So]icitor General, Judge Starr served on the United States Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit.
1. Timothy J. Sullivan is the President of the College of William and Mary and the
former dean of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law at William and Mary.
2. The Honorable William H. Rehnquist is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States.
3. The Honorable J. Harvie Wilkinson III is a judge on the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. Judge Wilkinson formerly served as Chief Judge of the
Fourth Circuit from 1996 to 2003.
4. Dr. William E. Cooper is the president of the University of Richmond.
5. John R. Pagan is a professor of law at the University of Richmond School of Law.
He formerly served as the dean of the law school from 1997 to July 2003.
6. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 332-38 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed.,
1977) (discussing the need for checks, balances, and general interrelation of the three
branches of federal government in order to maintain separation of powers).
7. See THE FEDERALIST No. 49, at 341 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1977)
("We have seen that the tendency of republican governments is to an aggrandizement of
the legislative, at the expence of the other departments."); THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 350
(James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1977) ("In republican government the legislative
authority, necessarily, predominates.... It may even be necessary to guard against dan-
gerous encroachments by still further precautions.").
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Everywhere, Mr. Madison wrote, the legislative branch is seek-
ing to draw matters into its "vortex"'-what we would today sim-
ply call power-grabbing. Now, to be sure, as we have seen over
the nation's history, excesses and abuses have occurred in the Ar-
ticle II and even in the Article III1" branches. And thus, a free
people are ever wise to be vigilant for dangers to balanced gov-
ernment, wherever they may arise.
In keeping with Dr. Franklin's famous admonition and obser-
vation as he left the convention in Philadelphia and responded to
the question of what sort of government have you given us, ours
is "a republic.., if you can keep it." 1 In keeping with the happy
occasion that brings us together in honor of Virginia's Chief Jus-
tice, let me add modestly to Dr. Franklin's description that ours is
a federal republic.
This is not France, and I mean no disrespect by saying it. Our
nation is not, and was not intended to be, a centralized republic.
That structural truth has been conveyed time and again, but es-
pecially over the last decade, by our Supreme Court, and I believe
wisely so.
And so it is that in reflecting on the judicial role and the role of
independence, we are wise to be attuned to the ever-present dan-
ger, articulated by Madison, of legislative intrusions, attacks, and
incursions that can have the effect of eroding the bedrock princi-
ple of independence of the judiciary.
Judicial independence is a large subject. It summons up power-
ful feelings of the uniqueness of the judicial role. We conjure up in
our minds images of Holmes's dissents, sometimes joined by
Brandeis, or Learned Hand's elegant tributes to this feature of
the constitutional republic-that judging is not to be politics sim-
ply by other means.
This means a struggle within the judicial mind-a continuing
one, as every current and former judge knows. The challenge is to
be self-disciplined, to look for decisional sources and materials
that are understood and identifiable, and to treat those materials,
8. THE FEDERALIST No. 48, supra note 6, at 333.
9. U.S. CONST. art. II (establishing the Executive branch).
10. U.S. CONST. art. III (establishing the Judicial branch).
11. 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 app. A, at 85 (Max Farrand
ed., 1911).
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including the materials of history, with respect and integrity.
These are not necessarily the means or mechanisms of politics,
and thus they are removed by structural design from the proc-
esses of the political branches.
These two worlds, that of the judicial process and law on the
one hand, and that of politics and legislating upon the other, most
visibly clash, not only in the exercise of the bedrock power of judi-
cial review, but also in the process of advice and consent. We have
come to know it as the confirmation process. I have been asked to
reflect briefly on that.
Are there principles that can guide this increasingly stormy
process when the judicial nominee climbs up that very tall hill
called Capitol Hill and enters the confirmation world of the
United States Senate? In review of our reflections this afternoon,
what do these principles, if we can identify them, teach us about
judicial independence?
Let me turn very briefly to the voices of three sitting members
of the Supreme Court of the United States. In his confirmation
hearings in 1987, Justice Kennedy said this in resisting answer-
ing a series of questions:
I think if a judge decides a case because he or she is committed to a
result, it destroys confidence in the legal system.
Senators and Representatives are completely free to vote for a par-
ticular bill because it favors labor, or because it favors business.
That is the way politics works, and that is your prerogative. To iden-
tify such an interest, it seems to me, is very candid.
That is improper for a court. The court must base its decision on
neutral principles applicable to all parties. That is inconsistent, in
my view, with deciding a case because it reaches a particular re-
sult.
12
Or consider Justice Souter's testimony in the early 1990s:
Is there anyone who has not, at some point, made up his mind on
some subject and then later found reason to change or modify it? No
one has failed to have that experience.
12. Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 144
(1987) (statement of Anthony M. Kennedy, Nominee, Associate Justice of the Supreme
Court of the United States).
2004]
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No one has also failed to know that it is much easier to modify an
opinion if one has not already stated it convincingly to someone else.
With that in mind, can you [Senators] imagine the pressure that
would be on a judge who has stated an opinion, or seemed to have
given a commitment in these circumstances to the Senate of the
United States, and for all practical purposes, to the American peo-
ple?
You understand the compromise that that would place upon the
judicial capacity and that is my reason for having to draw the line.
13
Or Justice Breyer in 1994:
Let us imagine, if I am lucky and if you find me qualified and vote
to confirm me, I will be a member of the Supreme Court, and, as a
member of that Court, I will consider with an open mind the cases
that arise in that Court. And there is nothing more important to a
judge than to have an open mind and to listen carefully to the argu-
ments.
... I do not want to predict or commit myself on an open issue
that I feel is going to come up in the Court. The reason for that is
two, there are two real reasons.
The first real reason is how often it is when we express ourselves
casually or express ourselves without thorough briefing and thor-
ough thought about a matter that I or some other judge might make
a mistake....
The other reason, which is equally important, is if you were a
lawyer or if I was a lawyer or any of us appearing before a court or a
client, it is so important that the clients and the lawyers understand
the judges are really open-minded. 14
These are the voices of the judicial perspective in the crucible
of confirmation. Confirmation hearings, as we witness from time
to time, build enormous hydraulic pressure. And historically, as
we have heard from these voices, there has been resistance by
nominees to answering specific questions. A specific example,
which I eyewitnessed, was that of Justice Sandra Day O'Connor
13. Nomination of David H. Souter to Be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 101st Cong. 194 (1990)
(statement of David H. Souter, Nominee, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the
United States).
14. Nomination of Stephen G. Breyer to Be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 103d Cong. 114
(1994) (statement of Stephen G. Breyer, Nominee, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court
of the United States).
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in 1981. Less than a decade had passed since the decision in Roe
v. Wade.'" She was pressed by two United States Senators to
opine on that particular case.
At that time, a very substantial majority in the Senate and
both parties agreed that this was unwise. 6 The Senators had the
power to ask the questions, but it would have been better and
more prudent to show restraint in the questions being asked.
Then-Judge O'Connor was wise to be prudent and cautious in not
providing an answer. The underlying premise, of course, is that
questioning can intrude, even for the best of reasons and motives,
into this bedrock value of independence.
Years ago, as a very young judge newly installed and just
learning my way around and beginning to try to learn the judicial
craft, I had an observation from a considerably more experienced
judge, soon to be the chief judge of the court on which I was privi-
leged to serve. He said, "Ken, you know that you are a judge exer-
cising your constitutional independence when your conscience
leads you to vote against the people who appointed you"--an in-
teresting test of independence.
The controversy suggests the need for judicial modesty and ju-
dicial restraint. We see that in various areas because it is these
areas that give rise to these issues that become so stormy in con-
firmation. The attitude of modesty or restraint is captured beauti-
fully in Gerald Gunther's marvelous biography of Learned Hand,
in which he stated that, "[his stance was modesty; his philoso-
phy, that of a skeptical democrat and experienced judge, doubting
the courts' competence to decide the problems of public policy that
tend to come before them under our Constitution, worried lest ju-
dicial interventions undermine the maturing of democratic proc-
esses"--the wise use of independence. 7
Was that a failure of will on Learned Hand's part? Was it an
unwillingness to live up to the responsibility of judicial review
and not having a more robust attitude toward his role as an inde-
pendent judge? I don't think so. Perhaps there will be disagree-
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
16. Memorandum from Grover Rees III, Counsel, Subcommittee on Separation of
Powers, to Subcommittee on Separation of Powers (Sept. 1, 1981) (discussing the proper
scope of questioning of Supreme Court nominees at Senate Advice and Consent Hearings).
17. GERALD GUNTHER, LEARNED HAND: THE MAN AND THE JUDGE 655 (1994).
2004]
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ment about that. But it is rather in the highest of our traditions
of taking fully into account the supremacy of the Constitution and
allowing self-government as a way to protect independence. This
is, in short, a vision of order and lawful independence-a value
that is of immeasurable worth in a constitutional democracy.
Perhaps as the confirmation process from time to time seems to
spiral downward, it would be useful to be reminded that it has
not always been thus, but there have been times, including in the
recent past, when voices of restraint in the process of confirma-
tion have been deeply respected by the world's greatest delibera-
tive body.
Thank you.
